There is a major change taking place in the manner that emotions are conceptualized. The change is one in emphasis, from structuralism to functionalism. Structuralism is marked by several defining features, including attempts to derive a taxonomy of basic emotions, the search for autonomic, facial, or central nervous system responses that have close to a one-to-one relation with internal emotional states, and a relative neglect of the role of intentionality in the generation of emotion. In contrast, functionalists propose that one cannot understand the nature of emotion without understanding what the person is trying to do, and how events in the external or internal environment have an impact on such strivings. Functionalists also stress the importance of conceptualizing facial, vocal, and gestural behaviors as signals that affect the behavior of other persons, and not just as outward signs of internal states. Because emotions are manifested in very flexible ways, functionalists steer their investigations away from the search for a "gold standard " by which an emotion can be operationalized. 
Emotions:
From the intrapersonal to the relational Functionalism in emotion theory is concerned not with evolutionary survival value, but rather with the link between emotion and what a person is trying to do. The functionalist approach is intrinsically relational (Lazarus, 1991) : It postulates that one cannot understand emotion by examining either the person or environmental events as separate entities. Person and event constitute an indissociable whole. One's perception of an event is never free of the potential it provides for action or its relevance to one's goals. Indeed, events gain significance through the strivings of the individual and thus both event and goal are intertwined (Lazarus, 1991) . By analogy, person and environment form the warp and woof of a carpet; each has a separate existence, but when interrelated both the warp and the woof lose their separate identities and the carpet then becomes the unit of perception.
A succinct definition of emotion from a functionalist perspective is: The attempt by the person to establish, maintain, change, or terminate the relation between the person and the environment on matters of significance to the person (J. Campos, R. Campos, & Barrett, 1989; Frijda, 1986) . This definition may initially appear to be odd, given the absence of any reference to the traditional elements found in the most prevalent definitions of emotion. For instance, there is no allusion to feeling, physiological reactions. facial expression patterns, or other intrapersonal criteria. Instead, emotion is synonymous with the significance of a person-event transaction. The more significant a transaction is, the more intense the emotion; the different kind of significance an encounter has, the different is the quality of the emotion.
What makes events significant?
The functionalist approach to emotion is predicated on the assumption that only events that are significant to the person are press) .
One of the most important theoretical advances in studying the link between goals and emotion is that of core-relational themes (Lazarus, 1991 Emotional contagion, the phenomenon whereby the face, voice, or gestures of another generates the same or a similar feeling and action readiness in the perceiver, is one means whereby social signals give events significance (Hatfield et al., 1994) .
Thus, the sight and sounds of joy can beget joy, those of fear can elicit fear, and so on. Indeed, even the perception of anger in another can lead to subsequent oppositionality, aggressive behavior, and anger-like emotion states, as the work of Cummings and colleagues has shown (Cummings, Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1981) . In developmental psychology, the work of Haviland and Lelwica (1987) suggests that affect contagion may appear as early as 10 weeks of age, while other studies show that affect contagion and related processes such -3-as empathy have powerful effects on the generation of emotions in infants and children (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Haviland & Lelwica,1987; Stern, 1985; Zahn-Waxler, 1991 (Fridlund, 1991; Jones et al, 1991) , and affect sharing, whereby the infant or adult deliberately targets an expressive display to another (Conrad, 1994 and emotion comes about when such stimulation is experienced, and then becomes the object of one's striving (Frijda, 1986 (Frijda, 1986) .
Here, a clarification is in order between the terms "pleasure and pleasantness," on the one hand, and "pain and unpleasant- (Young, 1975) . There is an extraordinary prevalence in our society of problems related to the striving for pleasures and sensory delights. Lazarus, 1991) , functionalists propose that emotions are understood from inferences based on (1) the way that behavior is organized, (2) suppositions about what the organism is striving to accomplish, and (3) determination of whether the striving is progressing smoothly or with difficulty (Lazarus, 1991; Sroufe & Waters, 1977 (Izard, 1971; James, 1890) . In most traditional theories, feelings are closely related to emotional behaviors, which are said to be motivated by and to follow, the feeling state (Clore and Ortony, 1984) . In still other theories (Izard,1971; James,1980; Laird, 1984) , the quality and intensity of feelings are explained as the result of feedback from the periphery of the body (i. e., the face, body, and internal organs).
In (Barrett & Campos, 1987; Kagan, in press ). fact that the infant is actually approaching the mother (Fox, in press). On the other hand, the right and left frontal regions may be specialized for different kinds of coping strategies (Dawson, in press ). In addition to raising questions about the link between emotion and physiology, the functionalists' concern that a given emotion can be manifested in different ways raises methodological issues. One such problem is that of inferring emotions from the functional properties of a stream of behavior. This is one of the most difficult problems facing functionalist
theories. An approach that begins to address this problem comes from attachment theory in developmental psychology, as well as from ethology (Bischof, 1976; Waters, 1978) . Sroufe and Waters (1977) proposed that, for the study of infantcaregiver attachment, "proximity-seeking" or "felt sec urity" could not be adequately (Barrett, in press ). There is no reason to consider such emotions "seconda- Finally, input regulation can occur in perceptual denial-the defense mechanism whereby the stimulus input itself fails to register into consciousness, as in the subception phenomenon described by Lazarus and McLeary (1951 and "suppression" (see Gross, 1993) and, hence, in the universality of specific emotions (Lazarus, 1991 Research in Child Development. Fridlund, A. (1990 
